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Artificial Intelligence and 
Spiritual Life1 
PAULC. VITZ 
Angels, whether one believes in them or not, are defined as rational beings 
without bodies. By contrast, we humans are known to be rational beings with 
bodies. In a standard Judea-Christian framework, humans are not only ra-
tional beings that happen to have bodies, they are embodied rational beings. 
That is, human mental life and human bodily life are theologically conceptual-
ized as inextricably interwoven. The Greeks and their modern idealistic heirs, 
on the other hand, see the human mind as only accidentally connected to the 
body. For those taking this approach, we humans are rational beings who just 
happen lo have bodies--but our bodies are only a necessary accident of having 
a physical existence and are not intrinsic to who and what we are. For these 
theorists, there is no necessary link between the nature of our body and the 
nature of our mind. 
I still remember, about 1960, as a graduate student in psychology, when I 
was first introduced to the concept of a computer program. My professors 
emphasized that the beauty and power of a program lay in its independence of 
the particular physical material in which it might exist. A program, like a 
statement in formal logic, could be written in chalk on a blackboard, it could 
exist as a sequence of ones and zeros as written in machine language, it could 
be punched as holes in a deck of IBM cards, it could be a magnetic pattern on 
tape, or it could be a sequence of electronic states in the computer itself where 
the program could be stored and then retrieved and run. These examples 
should make it clear that a computer program, in its very nature, is remarka-
bly free from any particular physical stuff. A program can be embodied in 
almost any material so long as the material in question allows one to fix the 
symbols expressing the program. And a program can be run in a computer 
that uses widely different basic electronic elements. The elements must allow 
for a rapid and reliable binary representation--e.g., on or off. However, vac-
uum tubes or silicon chips or who knows what in the future can serve this 
function. In short, the program with its structure exists independent of any 
particular physical medium. Strange as it may sound, a computer program is 
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somewhat closer to an angel, that is to a rational intelligence without a body, 
than it is to the mind of a human being--at least that is the claim being made 
here. 
In fact, this fundamental difference between a computer program and the 
human mind has long been established empirically in the biological sciences. 
And in the past few decades research in neurophysiology has very thoroughly 
elaborated and deepened the evidence that the human mind is dependent on 
the different particular materials of the brain. The research is well known, 
though apparently the implication--that computer programs are quite different 
from the human mind--is not commonly appreciated. Over 150 years ago, the 
great German physiologist Johannes Muller first clearly articulated what is 
known as the "law of specific nerve energies." Put simply, what this means is 
that a given nerve gives rise to a sense quality that depends on the specific 
character of the nerve. Stimulation of a visual nerve gives rise to visual 
experience; stimulation of an auditory nerve gives rise to the experience of 
sound, and so on. For example, in hearing there are specific nerve fibers in 
the cochlea for almost every specific sound frequency. Thus, the hair cells on 
the organ of Corti at the bottom of the cochlea respond to high frequencies, 
while those at the top respond to low frequency sound. Now this principle is 
far more general than the qualitative experience of the five senses for it 
characterizes the central nervous system--e.g., the cortex--as well as the 
peripheral senses. For example, recent research shows that this kind of 
qualitative specificity is present in the auditory cortex where it is known as a 
tonotopic map.2 That is, the frequencies to which the hair cells in the cochlea 
are sensitive are mapped into columns of cortical cells--with each column of 
cells responding only to a particular and very narrow band of tone frequencies. 
The columns of cells are laid out in a spatial pattern that reproduces the 
spatial structure in the cochlea. In short, the particular neurons in the 
auditory cortex are not interchangeable, general-purpose neurons like silicon 
chips; rather they are highly specific and qualitatively different. 
This same principle characterizes the visual system--indeed here the degree 
of specificity is, if anything, even greater than in the case of audition.3 In the 
retina it has long been known that there are three different kinds of color-
sensitive receptors (cones) plus light-sensitive receptors (rods). However, 
research starting three decades ago has demonstrated that retinal ganglion 
cells are also specialized for certain elementary kinds of light stimulation as 
well as for retinal Jocation--the best identified types of ganglion cells are 
known as X,Y and W cells; in the lateral geniculate nucleus (part of the brain) 
visual neurons are specialized for one of four colors, for location on the retina, 
and so on. In the visual cortex the specialized complexity expands even 
further. Here we find groups of visual neurons specialized for straight lines of 
different orientations ranging from vertical to horizontal (or spatial frequency 
analyzers); cortical visual neurons appear to exist that respond only to 
binocular disparity, while other groups of cortical neurons deal only with color 
processing, still separate systems appear to specialize in form and movement 
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perception. In short, throughout the structure of visual cortex there are 
qualitatively distinct channels analyzing or responding to elementary visual 
properties. Typically these channels process the various qualitatively different 
kinds of visual information in parallel, that is, at the same time. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century it has been known that elsewhere in the 
cortex there are special systems both for understanding speech (Wernicke's 
area) and for producing speech (Broca's area). The motor cortex is another 
major area of specialized neurons. Indeed the cortex is now known to consist 
of a very large number of interconnected sub-systems of neurons, each with 
specialized qualitatively different sensitivities. One major consequence of this 
now-established understanding of the cortex is that to simulate the human 
mind it will be necessary to simulate the human body. 
This extension of the law of specific nerve energies from the peripheral 
sensory system to the cortex clearly shows that the human brain operates on a 
principle that is the opposite of a digital computer. That is, digital computers 
are made of identical and interchangeable electronic elements. The possibility 
that certain chips, for example, could only process one kind of information 
(e.g., a payroll but not a mathematical equation or a business letter), would 
destroy the utility, the very raison d'etre of the modern digital computer. 
This is not to imply that all cortical neurons are qualitatively different from 
each other. Certainly within a cortical neural system there is some 
redundancy. Thus, a whole column of cells in the visual cortex may be 
sensitive to the same line orientation (or spatial frequency orientation); but 
this local redundancy should not be allowed to keep us from understanding 
that many different cortical areas are involved in qualitatively different kinds 
of processing and experience. 
In other words, the understanding of the cortex today is that it consists of a 
complex, interconnected group of sub-systems. Each of the many sub-systems 
represents a specialized and qualitatively different kind of processing; often 
these sub-systems are also associated with qualitatively different conscious 
experience. All th is means that the basic neural elements--or the "chips"--in 
each sub-system would have to be highly specific and different from those in 
each other sub-system; the same is also probably true for the large number of 
interconnecting neural structures. 
A different but closely related fundamental biological fact is that the 
nervous system and the human body are intimately linked with properties of 
the external physical world. As just one example, consider the range of light 
waves that the human eye is sensitive to. This range, known as the visible 
spectrum, is from about 380 nm (violet) to 760 nm (red). Now the potential 
spectrum of light (electro-magnetic energy) is enormously greater and ranges 
from extremely short waves (gamma rays) to very long radio waves and AC 
circuits. The visible spectrum is thus a very small slice of this potential 
spectrum. However, it is reasonable to assume that the human eye is only 
concerned with the light available on the surface of the earth. To be able to 
see waves that onJv exist elsewhere in the cosmos would he a wa!\te of 
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biological energy and tissue. The human eye is, however, responsive to almost 
all of the spectrum that actually reaches the surface of the earth with any 
significant amount of energy. Only the relatively small ultra-violet and infra-
red parts of the spectrum are not part of our sensitivity. That is, the hum an 
visible spectrum is close to the available spectrum on the surface of the earth. 
Over and over again scient ists find evidence of this type showing how the body 
is adaptcd--cven fine-tuned--to its environment. 
There arc two well-known major theoretical understandings of the complex 
and intimate connection between the human body and the external physical 
world.4 Among scientists today the most common is the atheistic or agnostic 
theory of evolution. This familiar intellectual framework assumes that life 
originated by chance and then evolved or developed over many millions of 
years. For those who hold this view, life forms are understood to be a 
marvelously complex, long-term, natural response or adaptation to the 
surrounding physical and biological reality. 
My own vicw--which can be called theistic evolution--accepts much of the 
previous position; but, like many others, I assume that the physical and 
biological world was created by God. In this framework the origin and 
evolution of life over time is a God-governed phenomenon. However, the 
nature of how the changes took place is a scientific question that can be 
investigated without reference lo the Divinity. In spite of theoretical conOicl 
about origins, both the atheistic and theistic versions of evolution accept 
almost all of the same scientific findings. That is, they both assum e that life in 
all its forms is closely connected to the outside environment in which life has 
developed and to which it is adapted. Thus, both kinds of scientists assume an 
animal 's nervous system can't be understood when separated from its body 
and neither the nervous system nor the body can be understood when 
separated from the animal's environment, since the three constitute a mutually 
interacting system. 
The major point that mi nd is embodied is, of course, not a new one. For 
example, recently it has been emphasized in the writings of the information 
theorist Donald MacKay5 and in the discussions of Artificial Intelligence (AT) 
by the philosopher Dreyfus, who sums his position by a quote from the poet 
Yeats: "Man can embody the truth, but he cannot know it."6 
I am aware that some of the difficulties that arise from ignoring the body 
arc beginning lo receive serious attention in Al and related areas. Neural 
nets, now fairly common, are a small step toward a more neurological or 
"body-like" model of the mind. Nevertheless, very serious difficulties remain 
before even a modest simulation of the biological basis of mind appears 
possible. One expression of the difficulties involved in the simulation of the 
human brain is represented by the terms "hardware" and "software." 
Hardware refers to the fixed physical and electronic components in a 
computer or robot. However, there is no real hardware analogy to the human 
body where even muscle and bone tissue arc, at best, a kind of "software." A 
computer program is called software, but there is no evidence that the 
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program level actually exists for humans. The body exists and conscious 
experience exisls, bul lhere is no evidence lhal a level analogous to a 
computer program exists as a functioning part of lhe brain/ mind. The 
difficulties involved derive from the fact that computers and robots are based 
on silicon while animal life is primarily carbon based. Computers are not, in 
principle, restricted to silicon systems, but they are all based on silicon 
(including neural nets) for what appear to be practical rcasons--namely silicon 
is cheap and allows very reliable binary representation. As such, silicon 
systems are devoted to dryness, so Lo speak, while carbon systems are devoted 
to wetness. Water quickly destroys or " kills" a computer, while too much 
dryness quickly kills humans and other animals. The brain is very much a wel 
system and simulating il will have lo involve simulating th is very fundamental 
property which is so different from computers. In brief, the human brain 
consists of d ifferent kinds of what might be called "wetware" and hardware 
and software are irrelevant o r misleading terms. In any case my fundamental 
point here is that a true simulation of the human mind would require a 
simulation of the human brain and body. Whether lhis is possible remains to 
be seen. 
In fact the intellectual world of the digital computer and of research on Al 
is often far removed from lhc body and the world within which the body lives. 
As previously no ted, the advocates of digital compuler programs as models of 
mind reject, or al least commonly ignore, the connections between the mind 
and body. They lend to present a very abstracted or idealized view of reason 
and of mental activity in general. With this as background and context, it is 
now time to focus on our central topic--nameiy, artificial intelligence and the 
spiritual life. 
First, I wish to emphasize that the prior point on the interrelationship of 
the mind and body is proposed as an analogy to a similar interrelationship 
between mind and spirit. Just as our mind is inextricably bound up with the 
body and physical reality, so it is likewise bound up with God and spiritual 
reality. Thus, I starl wilh the assumption that there is a lransccndent spiritual 
realm, and that the human mind is conslanlly interacting with this realm. 
Now, I am fully aware of the fact lhal it is precisely this assumption that is 
rejected by many scientists, especially those in the world of art ificial 
intelligence. I wi ll examine the basis of this rejection and present a case for 
the existence of spiritual reality. Obviously, this realm must first be accepted 
as existing before one can accept its relevance for an understanding of mind. 
Therefore, the subsequent remarks are primarily addressed to the skeptical or 
atheistic scientist. 
Throughoul human history and its varied cultures, three great external 
realms of reality commonly have been assumed to exist. These are lhe 
external physical world, lhe world of other minds and the transcendent 
spiritual world (for example, of God or the gods). An interesting feature that 
these lhrce presumed realities share is that we cannot prove the existence of 
any of them. Indeed, some years ago the prominent philosopher Alvin 
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Plantinga published a very important proof on the subjcct.7 Bric ny, what 
Plantinga was able to prove was that the degree of rational and empirical 
uncertainty about the existence of other minds and about the existence of God 
is exactly the same. That is, the ra tional grounds for accepting the existence of 
both of these realms has the same structure, and involves the same 
assumptions--assumptions Plantinga shows are often question-begging in both 
cases. For example, we never directly experience other minds and our 
assumption that they exist is based on an analogy with our own mental life. 
Plantinga's proof itself is sophisticated and cannot be summarized easily, but 
its general structure is not hard to outline. Plantinga first systematically shows 
that neither natural theology nor natural "atheology'' off crs a satisfying 
solution to the problem of a rational justification of belief in God 's existence 
or o f God's non-existence. He then tries another approach to the justification 
of belief in God by exploring its analogies and connections with a similar 
question--the "problem of other minds"; that is, how do you justify the 
existence of other people's minds. Plantinga goes on to "defend the analogical 
argument for other minds against current criticism and argue that it is as good 
an answer as we have to the question of other minds. But it turns out that the 
analogical argument finally succumbs to a malady exact ly resembling the one 
afnict ing the teleological argument [for God's existence]." He concludes that 
"belief in o ther minds and belief in God arc in the same epistemological boat; 
hence if either is rational, so is the other. But obviously the form er is rational; 
so, therefore, is the lattcr."8 His formal proof for this conclusion has stood 
without a successful challenge for over 20 years. 
Elsewhere Plantinga shows that just as we can't prove the existence of 
other minds, it is also impossible to prove the existence of external physica l 
reality, or even to prove the existence of the past.9 Again, he shows that the 
failure in each proof is identical to the failure in the teleological argum ent for 
God's existence. One obvious implication of Plantinga's work is that if 
scientists, for example, tend to assume the existence of physical reality and of 
other minds but to reject that of God, then this is done on non-rational 
grounds. Before turning to some of the non-rational reasons behind the 
rejection of the spiritual realm, it will be useful to discuss how it is that the 
existence of the external world is commonly accepted. First, the problem of 
proving the existence of external reality arises once one accepts the fact that 
our knowledge of external reality is always mediated by the nervous system. 
All we arc directly aware of is our own states of mind. We must--we can 
only--infcr an external reality existing behind and act ing as a cause of our 
sensations and perception. The validity of this inf crencc is what cannot be 
proved. We may accept Plant inga's reasoning in this matter o r we may be 
convinced on other grounds that proving the existence of the physical world is 
not possible. There is, of course, a long line of skeptics on this issue in 
Weste rn philosophy (including David Hume, Bishop Berkcly and Thomas 
Reid), whose writings certainly support Plan tinga's conclusion. 
Nevert heless, almost no one has ever doubted physical reality to the point 
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of trying seriously to live by such a position. If a person lived on the basis of 
such doubl il is nol clear why one would eat food, avoid walking into walls, or 
even bother to get dressed. A few idealist philosophers in the last two 
hundred years or so seem to be the intellectual representatives of a position 
that denies or comes close to denying the physical world. 
The overwhelming majority of scientists, and of average citizens of the 
world, have always accepted the existence of an external physical reality. 
Scientific theories are, after all, about something outside of us. The ground 
for this acceptance seems to be that we are so made that sensory and 
perceptual experience carries with it the overwhelmingly convincing notion 
that it is external reality that is experienced. Put somewhat diff crently, our 
normal interaction with what appears to be physical reality naturally creates a 
firm conviction of its existence. 
Of course, in some rare instance one's perception of external reality may 
be faulty. There are such things as illusions and hallucinations. But to believe 
that the whole realm of physical reality doesn't exist, or that most, or even 
much, of our perceptual experience is without an exte rnal source, would be 
considered--wo uld be--bizarre indeed. Except for certain kinds of 
philosophers, such as the just-mentioned idealists (who arc given a kind of 
philosophers' license to suspend common sense), anyone who fai led to believe 
in the external world would be judged as suffering from a mental pathology. 
Likewise, our belief in the existence of other minds comes from interaction 
with other people. Sensory contact with a person plus interaction involving 
language and symbols appears adequate for us to reliably assume the existence 
of othe r minds. The tendency to interpret other minds as existing is so strong 
that often it reaches the point of projecting mind onto something which is not 
mind at all. Children project human minds onto many animals; even trees or 
inanimate objects, especially at night, are often understood by children as 
having minds. Anthropologists commonly note that in so-called primitive 
cultures certain special objects, such as a mask or talisman, sometimes are 
supers titio usly und ers tood as possessing mind and spi rit. This 
anthropomorphism is one tendency scientists have traditionally guarded 
against. However, some of those in Al seem especially susceptible to this 
error of projecting mind onto objects. For example, one prominent Al 
scientist attributes beliefs to thermostats.10 Apparently thermostats have three 
beliefs: it is too hot, it is too cold, it is just right. That a thermostat has beliefs 
seems to me to be a rather crude, if updated, example of anthropomorphic 
thinking. 
Although even Al scientists may sometimes see in, or project mind onto 
things or places where it doesn't exist, few seriously propose that other minds 
don't exist. Even if mind is assumed to be an expression of matter, few doubt 
that other people's integrated consciousness--that is, thoughts, feelings and 
purposes--actually exists. For all practical purposes everyone assumes both 
the existence of other minds and also of physical reality. 
It is important to note that a crucial issue with respect to initiating and 
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maintaining contact with external physical or mental reality is whether the 
person has the wi ll or desire to initiate the interaction with the presumed 
reality. For example, suppose you find a man who is on an artificial respirator 
in a darkened room and who claims there is no external reality. After some 
investigation you discover that he has not walked, or used his eyes or cars for 
some time. His last tape-recorded utterance is a comment to the effect that 
there is no external physical world. You desire to cure him of this intellectual 
ailmcnt--one obviously supported by his markedly reduced physical and 
perceptual activity. A reasonable strategy would be to strengthen his muscles, 
get him to open his eyes, unstop his cars and lo talk with him often. Jn time, 
you, his guide, would ask him lo walk and later to come out of his room and, 
enter the outside world. Therapy for his pathological intellectual position is 
thus to immerse him in the direct intcractional experience of the reality that 
he denies. In this case there is every reason to believe that such a program 
would convince him of the realist position. But such a procedure depends 
upon his willingness to cooperate with you and, as for proof, that would 
remain, as always, impossible. 
Suppose you find someone who not only denies that other mi nds exist--but 
lives as though other minds don't exist. (Such a position, of course, seems to 
be quite rare.) Let us also suppose, as would be likely, that our subject's 
condition is strongly supported by his social isolation. He lives alone and has 
for years. He never speaks lo anyone. As a result , his lack of belief in other 
minds is hardly surprising. He remembers interacting with people when he 
was young, but these experiences he attributes to a childish and immature 
understanding of things al the time. Again, this man's condition is 
fundamentally a mental pathology and correction would involve the slow 
introduction of interpersonal communication into his life. In time he would 
discover fri ends, and enemies; perhaps even love. Years later, if he were to be 
reminded by an old friend of his form er belief that other minds didn't exist, 
the only answer, and a likely one, would be Lo look at his fri end and laugh. In 
short, interaction with other minds is necessary in order to accept their 
existence, indeed in most cases it is sufficient. 
Let me suggest that the situation with respect to belief in the transcendent 
spiritual realm is similar. First note that most of the people who deny not only 
the existence of God but also the entire spiritual realm constitute a relatively 
small group that seems to have come into existence in Western Europe about 
250 years ago. They live in rather peculiar environments, and most of them 
have been tra ined in science or other rationalistic and int ellectual disciplines. 
They tend to work in laboratories and universities which arc highly specialized 
and pecul iar places. They tend to socialize mostly with those having similar 
skeptical outlooks. What they mean by " real thi nking" is the mental 
manipulation of abstract written symbols, often numbers, or other very digital 
clements. To such people a proper belief system or world view is something 
constructed by correct sequencing of these symbols with occasional checks on 
whether some kind of observa tion backs it up. Thal is, their world view is 
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something that exists in a digital code and they seem to assume that digital 
codes are adequate for representing any kind of question, problem or 
knowledge. The very notion of a belief system based on an oral tradition of 
knowledge, or on analog information coded in the body and often unavailable 
to conscious verbal expression, or on a world view based primarily on direct 
personal experience, doesn't occur to them. 
Also "strange" is the fact that these people never, or almost never, go to 
church or to a synagogue or read religious writings. But, most peculiar of all 
is that they appear never to pray, to meditate or to engage in other spiritual 
exercises. That is, they rarely, if ever, use the well-known procedures for 
getting and staying in contact with the spiritual realm. 
Again, the answer to this pathology is not some vain attempt to prove the 
existence of God or of spiritual reality. As in the other cases this is impossible 
anyway. The answer is to try to convince such a person to pray, that is to talk 
with God, or listen for God's voice, or to engage in other spiritual activities. If 
such a person refuses to interact with the transcendent and is determined to 
remain in his spiritual isolation, there is little else one can do. 
This requirement that one engage in prayer and meditation is a serious 
one. For example, if someone doubted some astronomical claim (such as the 
existence of moons around Jupiter) or the reality of a whole level of physical 
existence (such as sub-atomic particles), an honest search for an answer would 
require a number of things. First, the person, if ignorant of astronomy or 
physics, would need a guide--a trained scientist--and would have to become at 
least something of an amateur scientist. It would take considerable time and 
commitment from the seeker. After all, observations are often ambiguous; 
and, in any case, observations don't reliably interpret themselves. 
In almost all religious and spiritual traditions, a knowledgeable person--a 
guide, if you will--is needed. And, prayer and meditation are the primary 
instruments, the " telescopes," for contacting or interacting with spiritual 
reality. No scientist who refuses to seek religious experience has the 
intellectual right to say that spiritual reality doesn't exist or that the mind 
cannot be affected by that reality. A person who has had no religious 
experience is simply unqualified to comment on the existence, much less the 
nature, of most spiritual phenomena. Please note, I am not saying that the 
person must have a particular interpretation or understanding of his religious 
or spiritual experience--only that he must have had a reasonable amount of 
such experience. Perhaps, after various religious experiences the person will 
conclude it was all an illusion or something other than what it first appeared to 
be. Fine. Scientific observations, too, can be mistaken; they can be artifacts, 
and so can particular spiritual experiences. Or perhaps even all such 
experience is illusory. However, a scientist without systematic empirical 
understanding of a phenomenon is not in a position to give informed criticism. 
And a scientist who was ignorant of and refused to get involved with the 
experimental methodology used to demonstrate that a major phenomenon 
existed would be considered irrelevant to evaluating the claim. If he actively 
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persisted in rejecting the phenomenon on a priori grounds, his colleagues 
would rightfully dismiss his claims as unqualified--even should subsequent 
research prove his position to be right. 
I trust the argument is clear. Religion for most people is supported by 
religious or spiritual experience in which people claim a relationship or 
interaction with a spiritual realm. This may mean interaction with God, or 
Jesus, or with a dead person, or even with evil spirits. To evaluate the validity 
of these extremely important claims requires that an investigator seek contact 
with spiritual reality. There are various ways people do this--but first they 
must have the will to actively seek. The desire to seek, of course, is something 
rooted in psychological factors and has relatively little to do with what is 
usually called by such terms as "reason" or "evidence." Given the will to seek, 
then the most common instruments or techniques for contact with spiritual 
reality are prayer and meditation; they are, the telescopes of the religious 
person. No true scientist should be afraid to seek new knowledge or be afraid 
to look through any kind of telescope. 
The primary reason for presenting the preceding case for belief in the 
transcendent realm is because of its bearing on the intellectual problem of 
artificial intelligence. Al is involved in simulation of intelligence--often this 
means simulating the human mind. The possible existence of mental 
interaction with spiritual reality, in particular with God, relates to this task. 
For example, if God exists and if some people, some of the time, are doing 
God's will and not their own will--then the problem of simulating human 
mental life takes on serious difficulties, to put it mildly. On the other hand, if 
God and other spiritual "persons" or forces are purely psychological 
phenomena, projected into " heaven" so to speak, then such concepts may add 
complexity to simulating the mind, but no dramatic new or impossible 
challenge is involved. 
A secondary reason, however, for introducing the topic of spiritual reality is 
to provide a framework for comment on the moral implications of state ments 
and attitudes sometimes found in the world of Al. In my own contact with 
scientists in Al, cognitive psychology and neuropsychology, sometimes I have 
encountered an attitude toward humans that I find extremely disturbing. A 
small but significant number of these scientists have a hard, hostile attitude 
toward any appreciation of humanity that implies human specialness. 
Apparently, the very notion of special human characteristics such as our free 
will or having a transcendent spiritual meaning is viewed as a threat to an 
intellectual desire to demonstrate we humans are nothing but matter, or 
nothing but a complex computer. Let me quote from one prominent Al 
professor. He said that the next generation of computers will be so intelligent 
that we will " be lucky if they are willing to keep us around as household 
pets."11 The attitude of hostility and even contempt expressed toward humans 
in such a statement is obvious. That humans will soon be the slaves to a 
master race of machines is, however, fundamentally a totalitarian goal. Why 
should anyone support such a purpose? If the proposed outcome is possible, 
then it is certainly morally rational for people to refuse to fund such scientists 
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and their research. If the goal is not possible, then the attitude expressed by 
such remarks does much to harm the good name of science. Scientists today 
are rightfully worried about the growth of an anti-scientific mentality in the 
non-scientific community. This growth is quite real, both on the political right 
and especially on the political left. However, subtle or gleeful comments 
about humans having no free will and soon being replaced by powerful, 
complex computers or bio-computer systems does little to endear science or 
scientists to the non-scientific world. Instead such fundamentally non-
scientific and often irrational statements by scientists create a morally justified 
fear of science on the part of those outside the scientific community. 
The very power, size and complexity of contemporary science suggests that 
it should be especially interested in avoiding the dangerous attitudes that 
power, size and complexity so often create. The contemporary scientific 
environment is very different from that of even 50 years ago. Today in science 
the effects of personal ambition, ideology, unscrupulous empire building, 
obvious financial rewards and power are especially noticeable. Interest group 
pressures, moral anarchy and lack of mutual cooperation also are not 
uncommon in the contemporary scientific community. Unless scientists work 
conscientiously to counter anti-scientific attitudes within AI, as elsewhere, 
there is real danger that growing external criticism of science will cause the 
scientific baby to be thrown out with its dirty bath water. In fighting such 
external criticism, science, which is (or should be) a bulwark of sanity should 
not allow itself to be poisoned from within by the anti-human and other biased 
attitudes of a small group of its present practitioners. 
Now, I am convinced that AI, cognitive psychology and neuropsychology all 
have major positive contributions to make to the human condition. I am 
equally convinced that this field needs to recover more of an attitude of 
humility as it studies the mind. Let me suggest that if scientists recover an 
awareness of God and of our spiritual destiny it may be a great facilitator of 
such an attitudinal change. An attitude of humility and wonder before the 
natural world has been an essential quality of the great scientists from 
Copernicus, Galileo and Newton to Einstein. Historically this attitude has 
been rooted in the belief in God. u 
In any case, although there is much to learn about both artificial and 
natural mind, to reject in advance a spiritual perspective on human mind 
because it implies limits to scientific understanding is an irrational bias. 
Science has learned to live with uncertainty principles, Godel's proof and 
similar knowledge about intellectual limits. Science has also learned to live 
with the mind/body problem. It can also learn to live with (and even to 
benefit from) a mind/spirit problem. 
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